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Redefining Sovereignty: An Analysis of U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon’s 
Rhetoric on the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine 
Jason A. Edwards  
 
Abstract 
This essay examines United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon’s rhetoric concerning 
the responsibility to protect doctrine (R2P).  This essay seeks to rhetorically map the 
arguments concerning the nature of R2P and what its specific components are.  Specifically, I 
argue that Ban Ki-Moon’s rhetoric serves to redefine and update sovereignty and the 
responsibilities of statehood for a twenty-first century world.  The rhetoric of R2P has 
important implications for the debates surrounding military intervention on “humanitarian” 
grounds.   
 
On September 20, 1999, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan addressed the 
U.N. General Assembly, imploring his colleagues to codify parameters which would 
authorize the United Nations to intervene through Security Council resolution, potentially 
militarily, in the internal affairs of another state if it is engaged in extreme criminal behavior, 
such as crimes against humanity.  As Annan put it, “if states bent on criminal behavior know 
that the Security Council will take action to halt crimes against humanity, then they will not 
embark on such a course of action in expectation of sovereign immunity” (quoted in Smith 
2007, 167).  The key phrase from this quotation was “sovereign immunity.”  Under the 
United Nations Charter all states are guaranteed the right of territorial integrity.  States may 
not militarily intervene in the internal affairs of others unless that particular nation engages in 
external actions that would warrant such a use of force.  The non-interference in the internal 
affairs of sovereign states has been a pillar of international law since the Treaty of Westphalia 
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in 1648.  Annan’s use of the phrase of “sovereign immunity,” in the context of the above 
quotation, was a plea to redefine this pillar for a twenty-first century world.    
In the decade since Annan made his request, there has been a good deal of movement 
on the subject of “sovereign immunity.”  In 2000, the government of Canada, along with 
other Western European governments and with the blessing of the United Nations, set up the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).   As a result of the 
commission’s work, a set of guidelines for judging a state’s internal behavior toward its 
populace was produced and entitled: The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine (also known as 
R2P).  In 2005, the World Summit produced a document that endorsed responsibility to 
protect and later unanimously reaffirmed by the Security Council in 2006 (Bellamy 2008).  
United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon has stated that codifying and 
operationalizing the principles of R2P will be one of his fundamental objectives while in 
office.  In a May 2008 speech, given at a conference on R2P in Berlin, the Secretary General 
kicked off his campaign to promote this objective.  Ban Ki-Moon’s oration is the subject of 
this essay.  This address is an exemplar of the arguments made by R2P advocates, like the 
Secretary General, as to what the responsibility to protect doctrine constitutes, what are its 
components, and what are its limits.  In other words, I use this speech as a means to 
rhetorically map the arguments for enshrining the responsibility to protect doctrine.  Through 
this rhetorical map, we find that the responsibility to protect doctrine promoted by Secretary 
Ban fundamentally redefines the concept of sovereignty for a twenty-first century world.   
Scholars should be interested in the Secretary General’s argument and this larger 
debate for a variety of reasons, but three that are most fundamental to this study.  First, the 
rhetoric of the U.N. Secretary General has received little attention from academics across the 
humanities and social sciences, particularly rhetorical scholars (for exceptions see Edwards 
2008).  Unlike other executives, the Secretary General has little power to control the behavior 
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of U.N. member states.  However, the Secretary General is the face of the United Nations.  
His discourse can set a broad agenda for the U.N. to accomplish various courses of action.  
Because of Ban Ki-Moon’s promotion of responsibility to protect, there have been and 
continue to be major debates within the United Nations General Assembly and the Security 
Council as to how it should go about enacting its various principles.  His discourse sets the 
parameters for how R2P will play out into the near future.  It serves as a rhetorical map for 
the larger debates that have been occurring in the United Nations on this issue. 
Second, the responsibility to protect doctrine offers a new orientation for military 
intervention in the twenty-first century.  Rationales for the use of force have been evolving, 
albeit slowly since the end of the Cold War.  Feste (2003) argues that a new paradigm of 
military intervention has emerged since the end of the Cold War.  This new paradigm 
reflected a, as she put it, “positive, offensive strategic thinking to shape the new environment: 
create internal order, build civil society in failed states, neutralize rogue states and/or their 
leaders, and alleviate human suffering in refugee populations” (p. 3).  The responsibility to 
protect doctrine is the ultimate fulfilment of this new paradigm.  It has implications for when, 
how, and why various states can use military conflict to achieve a variety of goals.  Peace and 
conflict studies scholars should find this new orientation of interest because it collapses the 
artificial (if there was any) dichotomy between peace and conflict.  One of the primary ways 
to think of the responsibility to protect doctrine is that it grants states permission to intervene 
militarily into the internal affairs of other nations that would engage in activities (a subject I 
will discuss in a later section) that would endanger their populations.  In other words, military 
intervention can become a means to achieve and maintain peace.  This new orientation 
toward military intervention offers a whole slew of theoretical possibilities, opportunities, 
and dilemmas that scholars and practitioners will have to grapple with in the near and long 
term. 
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Finally, the responsibility to protect doctrine has the potential to fundamentally alter 
three hundred years of what the concept of “sovereignty” actually means.  The concept of 
sovereignty is an important aspect in understanding how states deal with arguments for 
and/or against dealing with societies embedded in conflict (Evans 2009; Thakur 2011).  For 
example, nation-states, based upon traditional definitions of sovereignty, may deny access to 
aid workers, U.N. peacekeepers, or other entities that may attempt to help to resolve conflict 
in a particular state (e.g. the current problems that aid workers are having entering Somalia to 
deal with the famine).  The responsibility to protect doctrine opens up a space where 
proponents of peacekeeping or peacebuilding can provide a counter logic to traditional 
sovereignty arguments. These counter logics can potentially create even greater legitimacy 
for those who want to provide outside assistance to people in need.  This greater legitimacy 
creates more pressure upon nation-states to succumb to the viewpoints of the global 
community.  While the state may still resist such pressure, the alternative definition of 
sovereignty put forth by different groups takes a greater step toward becoming an 
international norm.  Thus, in future operations, those that invoke the responsibility to protect 
make it easier to legitimize operations in that particular state in the future and/or in other 
states, while making it more difficult for states to resist such an intervention.     
To that end, this essay moves in four parts.  First, I provide a methodology section 
where I discuss briefly rhetorical criticism and textual analysis.  Second, I then offer a 
discussion concerning the subject of sovereignty and the responsibility to protect doctrine.  
Third, I then analyze the rhetorical dimensions of R2P.  Finally, I draw implications from this 
analysis.  
Methodology 
The subject of this essay is Secretary General Ban-Ki Moon’s rhetoric concerning the 
responsibility to protect doctrine.  My goal is to map the rhetorical dimensions of this 
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doctrine and analyze how Secretary Ban’s rhetoric and R2P alter the definition of 
sovereignty.  Specifically, I examine his July 15, 2008 address at the “Responsible 
Sovereignty” conference in Berlin, Germany.  This address is exemplary because it contains, 
outlines, and defines the responsibility to protect doctrine.  In order to complete this task, I 
conducted a textual analysis of the Secretary General’s rhetoric.  Textual analysis is where 
the researcher attempts to make sense of and interpret a text, paying attention to what the 
author wanted to communicate, interpreting intended meanings and considering those texts in 
differing contexts such as cultural and/or intellectual (Brummett 2010; Foss 2004; Patton 
2002).  The relevant context would be determined based upon the goals of the research.  
Because the goal of this essay is largely to make sense of how Ban Ki-Moon defined the 
responsibility to protect doctrine, I outlined the intellectual context in which R2P was 
created.  That context is the next section of this essay. 
Textual analysis is often conducted in either a deductive or inductive format.  In a 
deductive format, the critic may use a specific form of rhetorical method that has already 
been established to look at a text or a set of texts.  For example, one of the more popular 
forms of textual analysis, particularly for those that study discourse, is genre criticism. There 
are a variety of textual genres that exist (i.e. apologias, State of the Union addresses, etc.).  In 
their book, Presidents Crafting the Presidency, Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall 
Jamieson (2008) examine how the institution of the presidency has evolved by examining 
presidential rhetoric genres such as presidential inaugurals, war addresses, state of the unions, 
veto addresses, farewell addresses, and more.  If one wanted to examine the inaugural address 
of future presidents they could use the generic characteristics outlined by Campbell and 
Jamieson to elucidate how future presidents maintain and change various aspects of the 
inaugural.  In other words, one way of conducting a deductive form of textual analysis is to 
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impose specific generic requirements upon a text and see if that particular text or set of texts 
meets those generic requirements and what are the implications of said analysis. 
Textual analysis can also be conducted inductively.  In this type of textual criticism, a 
researcher approaches a text or set of texts where s/he lets the texts “speak” to him or her.  In 
other words, the analyst does not have a predetermined set of ideas of what s/he is looking 
for, but uses the text to help elucidate specific ideas.  That does not mean that a critic 
examines a set of texts without some kind of theoretical knowledge.  Rather, it merely means 
that the critic does not approach a set of texts with a predetermined outcome.  For example, 
Vanessa Beasley (2004) examined how American presidents had constructed the identity of 
the United States over a hundred year period in the United States.  For this task, Beasley 
examined every single inaugural address of the United States over this hundred year period, 
proceeding to mark and note how the notion of U.S. identity evolved over time.  After she 
was done with this analysis, she assembled this analysis around a specific set of arguments 
she made about how American presidents constitute identity.  The key to inductive textual 
analysis was her argument.  Indeed, argument is the key to good textual criticism. Wayne 
Brockreide (1974) explained that textual criticism functions as argument. The most 
significant argument is one that explains.  The critic proceeds inductively by selecting 
concepts, categories, and dimensions of the discourse in question. Then the critic, with no 
commitment to an a priori statement of criticism, evaluates or explains a particular 
experience or accounts for rhetoric by relating it to larger concepts and principles. Similarly, 
James Darsey (1994) noted the critic’s job is to tell us something worthwhile that clarifies 
and illuminates dark places in our science, our histories, and our souls, something that 
increases “our understanding and facilitates our functioning within the world” (p. 176).   Thus 
the goal of criticism is to increase understanding of how the world functions and to evaluate 
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those functions.  The authority of the criticism comes through in the argument that has been 
made. 
In this particular essay, I approached Secretary General Ban’s address in an inductive 
manner.  While I approached it with some theoretical knowledge about R2P and sovereignty, 
I imposed no specific theoretical outcomes on the subject.  Rather, my goal has been to 
increase an understanding of how Secretary General Ban constructs the idea of R2P doctrine, 
constructs the idea of sovereignty and how it might function in further discussions of military 
intervention within the United Nations.  To that end, the next section provides an 
understanding of sovereignty and R2P and then analyzes the Secretary General’s discourse.   
Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect 
The concept of sovereignty has been a subject of contentious debate for hundreds of 
years.  Philosophers such as Jean Bodin, Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Carl 
Schmitt have all iterated their own principles of defining sovereignty.  For my purposes here, 
I am interested in how the concept of sovereignty has been debated in the realm of 
international relations.  For over three hundred years, the boundaries of sovereignty were 
largely the same.  Specifically, the focus has been on external sovereignty or the relationship 
between sovereign power (a national government) and other states.  The Treaty of Westphalia 
in 1648 established that all states had a right to territorial sovereignty.  Governments possess 
full control over their own internal affairs within a specific territorial or geographic area.  
Outside entities have no right to interfere with the internal affairs of another state unless it is 
engaging in some nefarious activity that would directly endanger another state.  Territorial 
sovereignty has been further codified within the United Nations.  According to the U.N. 
Charter, article 2, paragraph 7, nothing in international law allows another state to “intervene 
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state” (United 
Nations, 1945, ¶ 12).  For over forty years, since it was ratified by member states and for 
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three hundred years prior to that, the happening within the “domestic jurisdiction of any 
state” has been a sacrosanct aspect of international law.   
However, a series of developments after the Cold War made many argue that it was 
time to update or at the very least have a serious debate on redefining the parameters of 
sovereignty.  Specifically, the inability of the international community to generate the 
political will to intervene in the Rwandan genocide and the NATO intervention into Kosovo 
to stop ethnic cleansing; served as an impetus for a new debate on the responsibilities that 
sovereign governments have toward their populations; and what would be the grounds to 
intervene, if any, to assist populations who were threatened by their own governments.  As 
noted in the introduction, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan challenged the 1999 
General Assembly, as well as in 2000, to resolve this tension between sovereignty and human 
rights (Bellamy 2008; Luck 2010; Pattison 2010).  In 2000, Canadian Prime Minister Jean 
Chretien announced that an independent International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty would be established to create a broader framework for legitimizing 
humanitarian intervention.  The commission’s mandate was to “build a broader understanding 
of the problem of reconciling intervention for human protection purposes and sovereignty, 
and more specifically, to try to develop a global political consensus how to move from 
polemics . . . towards action” (ICISS 2001, 2).   
In 2001, the ICISS published its final report, The Responsibility to Protect.  The 
ICISS report argued that in order to build international consensus on the protection of human 
populations and resolve the tension between human rights and sovereignty two new strategies 
were needed.  First, Responsibility to Protect defined the circumstances under which 
international society should assume responsibility for preventing, halting, and rebuilding after 
a humanitarian emergency. Those initial circumstances were mass killings and ethnic 
cleansing.  Only under those two circumstances would states be allowed to intervene in the 
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domestic affairs of other states.  Second, the language of “humanitarian intervention” must be 
changed.  In fact, the ICISS document recommended that the concept of “humanitarian 
intervention” be dropped completely for two reasons.  First, the concept of a humanitarian 
military operation always deeply concerned humanitarian aid organizations; how can 
“military” intervention be truly “humanitarian” was the question many aid organizations were 
asking (Bain 2011; Benjamin 2009; Bellamy 2010; Chandler 2004; Evans 2009; ICISS 
2001).  The answer: it cannot.  The conflict in terms damaged the mission of humanitarian aid 
agencies; thus, the need for a change in language.  Additionally, many states that intervened 
on “humanitarian” grounds did so to serve their own interests (Chandler 2002; Doyle 2011).  
These states declared their missions as “humanitarian,” while they intervened to secure more 
territory, resources, or concessions from a weaker state.  This specific definition of 
circumstances and changing the language from “intervention” to “protection” had the effect 
of, according to former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and U.N. Secretary 
General Adviser Mohamed Sahnoun (2002), changing:  
The essence of sovereignty, from control to responsibility . . . Indeed even the 
strongest supporters of state sovereignty will admit today that no state holds unlimited 
power to do what it wants to its own people.  It is now commonly acknowledged that 
sovereignty implies a dual responsibility: externally, to respect the sovereignty of 
other states, and internally, to respect the dignity and basic rights of all the people 
within the state. (103) 
The concept of “responsibility to protect” that emerged from the ICISS report served to alter 
and update the characteristics of sovereignty for the twenty-first century.   
 When The Responsibility to Protect was released it was received favorably by many 
states including Argentina, Australia, Canada, Columbia, Croatia, Germany, Ireland, Norway, 
South Korea, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, as well as other countries (Bellamy 2006; 
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Bellamy 2009).  Yet, there was a hefty bit of skepticism from a variety of parties.  For 
example, aside from Great Britain, the permanent members of the Security Council (United 
States, China, France, and Russia) voiced opposition to the concept of responsibility to 
protect because it might undermine the U.N. Charter and/or take away power from the 
Security Council when making decisions about intervening in other states (Benjamin 2010; 
Welsh 2004).  Additionally, the Non-Aligned Movement of countries (e.g. Egypt and India) 
rejected the concept because they argued that mechanisms were already built into the United 
Nations to prevent mass killing and ethnic cleansing.  Moreover, they were concerned about 
how it might undercut the traditional principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty 
(Bellamy 2006, 2009, 2010; Bain 2011).  They did not want the Great Powers dictating rules 
to small and developing nations. 
 Despite this skepticism, the ICISS and Secretary General Kofi Annan continued to 
promote R2P, trying to achieve an international consensus of the issue.  From 2002-2005, 
these actors held regional roundtables, attempting to address many of the concerns raised by 
members of the Security Council, the Non-Aligned Movement countries, and international 
aid organizations (Bellamy 2006).  The important item here was that a large international 
consensus was reached, at least conceptually, on R2P.  In the outcome document produced 
from the 2005 World Summit, paragraphs 138 and 139 outlined this accord.  While these 
paragraphs are long, they are worth quoting at length.  They stated: 
138. Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its population from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.  This 
responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, though 
appropriate and necessary means.  We accept responsibility and will act in accordance 
with it.  The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help 
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States to exercise their responsibilities and support the United Nations in establishing 
an early warning capacity. 
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the 
responsibility to use the diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means, in 
accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, to help 
protect populations from war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.  
In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive 
manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including 
Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional 
organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national 
authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.  We stress the need for the General 
Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, and its 
implications, bearing in mind, the principles of the Charter and international law.  We 
also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping states build 
capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and 
crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises 
and conflicts break out. (quoted in Bellamy 2008, 622-623)  
It is important to note an evolution in the responsibility to protect from the ICISS report to 
the World Summit document.  The ICISS report argued that intervention into the domestic 
affairs of states could be justified based upon mass killing and ethnic cleansing.  However, 
the concept of “mass killing” is somewhat amorphous; what constitutes “mass killing” in 
international law?  That language changed in the 2005 World Summit outcome report, where 
violations of a state’s sovereignty could be justified only on four crimes: genocide, war 
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crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.  On its surface, this may appear to be 
an expansion of the responsibility to protect from the ICISS report.  In reality, the World 
Summit document narrows the possibility of intervention because genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity all have fairly precise definitions and 
characteristics that have been inscribed by international law.  Thus, the circumstances that 
would have allowed intervention under the ICISS document have been clarified extensively.   
 The World Summit outcome document outlined a consensus on the parameters of the 
responsibility to protect concept.  However, operationalizing that concept has become 
difficult since 2005.  When Ban Ki-Moon became Secretary General in 2006, he stated that 
translating “R2P from ‘words into deeds’ as one of the cornerstones of his Secretary-
Generalship” (Bellamy 2008, 615).  Since 2008, the Secretary General has attempted a 
rhetorical campaign to promote and operationalize the concept.  In the next section, I examine 
this campaign by focusing on one major address on this subject. This speech is representative 
of smaller statements he has made on R2P over the past two years.   
Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon’s Rhetorical Campaign for R2P 
 Since he became the U.N. Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon has been on a campaign 
to take the 2005 World Summit consensus about the responsibility to protect doctrine and 
turn it into specific action or as he put it “turning lofty words into practical deeds . . . it is 
high time to turn the responsibility to protect into practice” (2009 ¶ 9).  On July 15, 2008, 
Secretary General Ban began this campaign with an address at the “Responsible Sovereignty: 
International Cooperation for a Changed World” event in Berlin, Germany. 
The Nature of 21st Century Sovereignty 
In his Berlin address, Ban sought to clarify and defend the responsibility to protect 
concept.  Secretary General Ban began his address with the traditional pleasantries to his 
audience, declaring how “fitting it was that we address these matters in Berlin, where the 
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twentieth century learned such hard lessons about the dangers of unbridled and irresponsible 
sovereignty” (¶ 2).  In the next sentence, he juxtaposed that idea by stating, “Today, Germany 
stands as a model of the responsible sovereign, at home and abroad” because it stands for the 
“curative properties of the principles of human rights, tolerance and the rule of law, for which 
the world body proudly stands” (¶ 2).  The “irresponsible sovereignty” to which the Secretary 
General referred to was most certainly a reference to the Holocaust, where the German Nazis 
attempted to destroy a significant portion of their own populace; whereas, the modern 
Germany was a “model of the responsible sovereign” because it protected its populations 
from harm.  By offering a quick analogy between Nazi Germany and the modern version, 
Ban Ki-Moon began to redefine and reformulate how the concept of sovereignty should be 
approached.  Sovereignty claims were not merely relegated to external territorial claims, but 
involved the internal affairs of a state.    
  From there, Secretary General Ban began to articulate R2P in more specific terms.  
Initially, he did so by describing what the responsibility to protect was not.  Olson (1989) 
noted that describing what something is not leads to greater clarity and gives arguers clearer 
and potentially firmer argumentative grounds to stand upon.  In his description of the nature 
of R2P, Ban Ki-Moon stated that “R2P is not a new code for humanitarian intervention” (¶ 
4).  Additionally, “R2P should also be distinguished from its conceptual cousin, human 
security.  The latter, which is broader, posits that policy should take into account the security 
of people, not just of States, the whole range of interests” (¶ 4).  If responsibility to protect 
was not humanitarian intervention or human security then what was it? According to the 
Secretary General, the responsibility to protect is “built on a more positive and affirmative 
concept of sovereignty as responsibility” (¶ 4).  In declaring R2P, as “sovereignty as 
responsibility” Secretary General Ban, similar to his German analogy, reformulated and 
redefined traditional notions of sovereignty.  As noted earlier, since the Treaty of Westphalia, 
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as a concept sovereignty’s dimensions dealt with external issues.  Internally, states were 
allowed to pursue policies as they pleased, as long as they did not interfere with the internal 
affairs of other states.  When Ban Ki-Moon constructed the responsibility to protect as a 
synonym for responsible sovereignty, he argued that the definition of sovereignty for the 
twenty-first century must be expanded to where the internal affairs of a state are just as 
important as its external affairs.  In essence, Ban Ki-Moon turned sovereignty on its head.  
When a state did not or could not protect their populations, then the international community 
had an obligation to step in and help.   
Despite this redefinition of sovereignty, Secretary General Ban asserted, later on in 
his address, that R2P actually reinforced and extended traditional conceptions of sovereignty.  
As he put it: 
Equally incorrect is the assumption that the responsibility to protect is in 
contradiction to sovereignty.  Properly understood, R2P is an ally of sovereignty, not 
an adversary.  Strong states protect their people, while weak ones are either unwilling 
or unable to do so.  Protection was one of the core purposes of the formation of States 
and the Westphalian system.  By helping states meet one of their core responsibilities, 
RtoP seeks to strengthen sovereignty, not weaken it (¶ 16).   
The key to understanding how R2P reinforces sovereignty is Ban’s logic behind the term 
“ally.” According to Ban, the “formation of States and the Westphalian system” were set up 
to “protect their people.”  The strength of a state is determined by how well its people are 
treated.  The responsibility to protect, as I will demonstrate shortly, sets up mechanisms for 
the international community to recognize and act preventatively in the internal affairs of 
“weak states.”  Accordingly, these states can correct their problems, protect their populations, 
and take their place amongst strong states.  By operationalizing R2P, the strength of a nation-
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state based international system can be extended and the core of the Westphalian system is 
left intact.   
At the same time that Secretary Ban perpetuated the Westphalian system, he also 
reconstructed it for a twenty-first century world.  Ban Ki-Moon’s rhetoric re-constructed 
what a true nation-state is within the international system.  Under the old U.N. charter, all 
states are guaranteed territorial sovereignty, whether you protect your population or not.  
Under the responsibility to protect doctrine only states that protect their citizens, “strong 
states,” can be considered true members of the international community. States that do not 
protect their citizens and violate their fundamental human rights are outside the Westphalian 
system.  These states are not true nation-states.  Thus, the responsibility to protect doctrine 
updates the nature of what constitutes a nation-state in the twenty-first century.  Those that 
are outside those parameters cannot be considered full-fledged members of the international 
community.  Considering that no rational state and/or leader of a state want to be the outcasts 
of the international community, which could cause them to lose benefits that come with such 
a membership (i.e. free trade) and avoiding punishment (U.N. sanctions), implies states will 
cooperate with the new standard of sovereignty to protect one’s population.   
 Throughout his address the Secretary General reinforced his definition of R2P and 
redefinition of sovereignty with the constant invocation of the 2005 World Summit.  The 
Secretary General used phrases such as “adopted by the World Summit,” “Governments 
unanimously affirmed,” “The Summit underscored,” and “as the 2005 recognized,” while 
also quoting from the World Summit outcome document.  Recall that the World Summit 
outcome document laid out a clear consensus on the responsibility to protect doctrine and the 
responsibilities states have to their populations.  By invoking the World Summit, the 
Secretary General demonstrated that his rhetorical vision was in line with the sentiments of 
the international community.  His invocation of that document functioned as a source of 
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authority for his definition of R2P, creating argumentative grounds that make it difficult for 
R2P opponents to disrupt the Secretary General’s reformulation of sovereignty.  In order to 
generate opposition to R2P, those critics would have to make arguments against the 
understanding of R2P within the world document, a task that would probably prove to be 
quite difficult.  Accordingly, the Secretary General’s vision really becomes the de facto 
position on the subject, moving his overall goal of operationalizing R2P one step closer to 
fruition. 
The Ingredients of Responsibility to Protect 
 After defining the nature of responsibility to protect as responsible sovereignty, Ban 
Ki-Moon went onto define and describe the essential components of R2P.  For the Secretary 
General, R2P “rests” on three pillars.  First, R2P deals with only four specific crimes 
“genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity” (¶ 4).  A few 
paragraphs later he reinforced the specifics of R2P by stating “our conception of RtoP, then, 
is narrow but deep . . .extending the principle to cover other calamities, such as HIV/AIDS, 
climate change or response to natural disasters, would undermine the 2005 consensus and 
stretch the concept beyond recognition or operational utility” (¶ 9).  In a short 1600 word 
address, Ban continually emphasized this point—that R2P was only concerned with four 
specific crimes.  Why? Certainly, his assertion that if you extended R2P to other calamities, it 
would “stretch the concept” beyond utility is part of his reasoning, but I believe there is a 
deeper logic.  By specifically articulating when R2P would be invoked, the Secretary General 
circumscribed the grounds upon which he can argue, but more importantly he circumscribed 
the grounds upon which his opponents could argue.  In order to oppose responsibility to 
protect, opponents would have to engage his arguments.  Additionally, these four crimes 
make it much easier to agree in what circumstances they should agree.  Considering that no 
truly rational nation-state would endorse genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes 
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against humanity, it makes it much more difficult for opponents of R2P to mount serious 
opposition and induces cooperation amongst U.N. member states.  Accordingly, the Secretary 
General positioned his rhetorical worldview of what sovereignty constituted and the 
responsibility to protect to be widely adopted by the international community.   
The second “pillar” of R2P was the international community’s commitment to help 
states that might be in danger of meeting their protection obligations.  The Secretary General 
noted:  
our goal is to help States succeed, not just to react once they have failed to meet their 
prevention and protection obligations.  It would be neither sound morality, nor wise 
policy, to limit the world’s options to watching the slaughter of innocents to send in 
the marines.  The magnitude of these four crimes and violations demands early, 
preventative steps—and these steps should require neither unanimity in the Security 
Council nor pictures of unfolding atrocities that shock the conscience of the world.  
(¶ 7) 
Ban Ki-Moon spoke to a fundamental problem that has plagued the international community 
and the United Nations for decades: the lack of political will to intervene to prevent great 
human tragedy, like genocide.  The United Nations has been constantly criticized as an 
organization that is reactive instead of proactive and preventative.  And when it has reacted, it 
typically has taken a Security Council resolution, which is an arduous process in and of itself, 
to get the international community to do something.  When it was founded, it was thought 
that it would be a place where states could bring their disputes and settle them in an 
environment of diplomacy and collaboration, while great international tragedies could be 
prevented because of increased cooperation.  However, the expectations of the United 
Nations have never been fulfilled.   
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Initially, the forty years of the Cold War prevented this vision from moving forward 
because the U.S. and Soviet Union focused on their own interests instead of the international 
communities. After the Cold War, there were high hopes that the U.N. would become a 
driving force in changing the international environment.  Since the end of the Cold War, 
Secretary Generals Boutros-Boutros Ghali and Kofi Annan have waxed eloquently and 
fought to transform the United Nations from a large debating society to an organization that 
can respond in a timely manner in preventing the loss of massive life.  However, states, 
including the United States, focused on their own interests first, instead of the international 
community’s.  And when states did intervene (e.g. Kosovo and Darfur) the United Nations 
was bypassed in favor of regional organizations where consensus and cooperation could be 
handled more quickly.  Thus, in the post-Cold War world, the United Nations continues to 
have a perception problem as an organization that does not have the will or the capacity to act 
in serving humanity.   For Secretary General Ban, R2P is the mechanism to fulfill the original 
vision of its founders.  Because R2P focuses on such a small subset of calamities and there is 
a larger consensus that something needs to be done to prevent these crimes, as evidenced by 
the 2005 World Summit Outcome document, there should be less of a problem getting the 
international community to act.  In this sense, Ban Ki-Moon not was not only attempting to 
redefine sovereignty in this speech, but the United Nations itself.   
The final ingredient of R2P was “much discussed, but generally understood too 
narrowly” (¶ 8).  It encompassed “member states’ acceptance of their responsibility to 
respond in a timely and decisive manner, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to 
help protect populations from the four listed crimes and violations” (¶ 8).  That response 
involved a range of UN tools including diplomatic, economic, and potentially armed 
intervention to prevent war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing.  
For Ban Ki-Moon, the key was “in an early and flexible response, tailored to the specific 
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needs of each situation” (¶ 8).  Here, Ban Ki-Moon attempted to clear up fundamental 
misconceptions of R2P.  Recall that one significant misgiving of R2P critics was that they felt 
it would promote military intervention as the primary option in cases of genocide and/or 
those states also asserted, if they signed onto, R2P they would be forced to participate in a 
military mission.  Because of those fallacies the Secretary General argued that this pillar had 
been “much discussed, but understood too narrowly.”  What R2P really contained was a 
range of options—economic, diplomatic, and potentially armed intervention—that would be 
“tailored to the specific needs of each situation.”  For Secretary General Ban, there was no 
one-size-fits-all situation.  R2P provided the United Nations with a “flexible response,” 
replacing the old system where the “the world’s options” were limited “to watching the 
slaughter of innocents or to send in the marines.”  Because R2P received widespread 
consensus and commitment from the global community at the World Summit, giving the 
United Nations a range of options to use, R2P was more progressive.  By clarifying R2P, Ban 
negated a fundamental argument of his opponents, while at the same time promoting his 
vision for the future of the United Nations.       
Ultimately, Secretary General Ban argued that R2P could have profound implications.  
If states could “summon the will to act collectively” then it might deter other states from 
committing atrocities.  Moreover, if:  
United Nations rules, procedures and practices are developed . . . then there is less 
likelihood of RtoP principles being used to justify extra legal interventions for other 
purposes.  In other words, the responsibility to protect does not alter the legal 
obligation of Member States to refrain from the use of force in conformity with the 
Charter.  Rather, it reinforces this obligation.  By bolstering United Nations 
prevention, protection, response, and rebuilding mechanisms, RtoP seeks to enhance 
the rule of law and expand multilateral options. (¶ 14-15) 
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Certainly, the responsibility to protect doctrine was contingent upon U.N. member states to 
“summon the will to act collectively.”  However, R2P, according to the Secretary General’s 
logic, was vastly superior to the current system of “humanitarian intervention.”  Recall that 
one of the conflicts with the term “humanitarian intervention” was that many states 
intervened in other states, not for humanitarian interests, but for “other purposes.”  Because 
R2P was relegated to a small subset of crimes, the potential to abuse the concept was 
significantly lessened.  Moreover, R2P was more than a mere military response to war 
crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, or ethnic cleansing.  Rather, it was a range of 
options whose primary purpose was to engage with weak states that might be susceptible to 
such behavior.  These options gave the U.N. member states more options than merely 
“watching the slaughter of innocents or sending in the marines.” Therefore, R2P acts as a 
basis to redefine humanitarian intervention from a stark dichotomy of choices to a range of 
options that the U.N. could attempt to use at varying stages of an international crisis. By 
operationalizing R2P, the United Nations could enhance its mission to protect populations 
from their governments, weak states could become strong states, and the United Nations 
could regain its moral voice in the international community.  Secretary General Ban Ki-
Moon’s strategy of definition put forward a set of arguments about R2P that may make his 
rhetorical vision possible. 
Conclusions 
 In this essay, I have examined U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon’s rhetoric on the 
responsibility to protect.  Specifically, I examined an address he gave in Berlin in July 2008 
that began his campaign to codify and operationalize R2P principles in U.N. practices.  I did 
so to rhetorically map how he constructed the nature of twenty-first century sovereignty, as 
well as the specific components of R2P. Ultimately, R2P serves to redefine and update the 
parameters of sovereignty and humanitarian intervention for the twenty-first century.  In turn, 
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the Secretary General’s rhetoric set the agenda for the larger U.N. debate that is currently 
taking place over the responsibility to protect doctrine. While this was an initial exploration 
into the larger debate on the responsibility to protect doctrine, we can draw larger 
implications for this analysis. 
 First, longstanding definitions of sovereignty are rapidly changing in a globalized 
environment.  The creation of R2P, the consensus of the World Summit, and the recent 
attempts to codify the principles of responsibility to protect suggests that slowly, but surely, 
an international norm on internal sovereignty is developing.  Evidence of this norm can be 
found in NATO’s Kosovo intervention to stop ethnic cleansing, the intervention by Australia 
into East Timor in 1999, and the African Union force trying to keep the peace within Darfur.  
More recently, the intervention by NATO forces into Libya to stop Moammar Gaddafi’s 
attacks on citizens was characterized as an important first step for the responsibility to protect 
doctrine (Thakur 2011).  In giving approval for the Libya intervention by the United Nations 
Security Council, the language of the resolution they put forth strongly resembled the 
principles of R2P.   In addition, more and more states have been putting the welfare of the 
individual, an emphasis on human security instead of state territorial sovereignty, into their 
foreign policy platforms (e.g. Canada).  The action of the Security Council, coupled with 
initiatives by individual nations, suggests that the concern of individual populations will 
become more prominent in international affairs. It may be that the international community is 
more willing to care for those populations if they are abused by sovereign governments.  
Future research could examine how governments have instituted the policies of R2P within 
their foreign policy platforms and also its conceptual cousin human security.  As more 
governments adopt these ideas, they will create greater acceptance of this international norm 
(see Prantl and Nakono, 2011 for an excellent study). Moreover, a full discussion of how the 
debate over R2P affected and/or is affecting the decision to intervene in Libya and continue 
Peace and Conflict Studies 
Volume 19, Number 1 57 
that military campaign would lay important groundwork as to how R2P may be 
operationalized in the future. 
Second, there appears to be a developing consensus regarding specific circumstances 
that would invite intervention into the internal affairs of nation-states.  The narrow 
parameters of R2P make it easier for governments to make arguments that they should 
intervene—diplomatically, economically, and militarily—where genocide, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing are taking place.  While this is no guarantee 
that the international community will create the political will to stop genocide or ethnic 
cleansing, the fact that this issue has received so much attention demonstrates that there is a 
subtle, positive shift in how armed force should be used, as Feste (2003) argued, in dealing 
with outlaw regimes that severely abuse their people.  Examining how political leaders have 
justified their intervention into places like Kosovo, East Timor, and Darfur would illuminate 
how these leaders are constructing this issue and the rhetorical topoi they use in making the 
case for the commitment of their armed forces. 
Finally, it has been the claim of this paper that Ban Ki-Moon’s definition of R2P and 
redefinition of sovereignty have set the agenda for the larger debate that is taking place 
within the U.N. General Assembly.  A comparison study of the Secretary General’s discourse 
and those that support the operationalization of responsibility to protect would be interesting 
to see if his ideas have taken hold.  Additionally, looking at how the opposition frames this 
debate will help us unlock its overall contours.  A major debate on the subject of R2P 
occurred in the fall of 2009.  That debate would be a good place to start where scholars could 
compare the different arguments that people used supporting, opposing, or being neutral 
toward this new doctrine. 
Despite these implications and the potential for further research there are limitations 
for this study; two of which I would like to highlight here.  First, this study is merely an 
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exploratory essay.  The Secretary General’s rhetoric can help set the parameters of R2P for 
future debates, but that does not mean it can and/or will not be modified by the United 
Nations.  In outlining the parameters of R2P and how it may alter definitions of sovereignty 
for a twenty-first century, I cannot make any claims that other nation-states support the 
Secretary General’s ideas or that there might not be severe push-back by several powerful 
states including the United States and China (see Prantl and Nakano 2010; Teffit 2011).  
Despite some initial traction for R2P gaining force as a doctrine of international behavior 
(such as in the Libya intervention) there is no guarantee that R2P will continue to be used by 
nation-states for other problem spots around the world.  It also does not answer the discussion 
of the specific decisions where, how, and why states might intervene under the auspices of 
the responsibility to protect doctrine, but not intervene in others (for example, Darfur—see 
Benjamin, 2010).  That is a problem this study cannot answer and may never be answered 
fully. 
 Second, while the study of rhetoric is a valuable tool for understanding how 
intellectual ideas evolve (it is my area of academic expertise), studying the rhetoric of any 
political figure cannot specifically discern an effect on the foreign policies of nation-states.  It 
would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether or not nation-states are altering 
how they conduct their foreign policy because of the rhetoric of the Secretary General.  Thus, 
trying to develop causal links between rhetoric and potential effects are problematic.  Along 
similar lines, rhetoric is an important tool in public diplomacy, but it is a tool that can be 
totally ignored by states who may disagree with such rhetoric.  It does not have the force of 
economic sanctions or some kind of military intervention.  Thus, the power of words may 
have little impact on a state’s behavior, even if they subscribe to the viewpoint put forth by 
the Secretary General. 
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That said, the responsibility to protect doctrine has the potential to be one of the great 
advancements in international law within the last one hundred years.  Whether nation-states 
act on the principles they uphold will be the ultimate test for these principles.  Considering 
that there will almost assuredly be a state that commits acts that fall under R2P, how the 
international community reacts will determine whether or not a global consensus has really 
been met on this issue.  This area of research will no doubt be a fruitful line of research for 
scholars in rhetoric, political science, history, sociology, reconciliation, and peace and 
conflict studies for years to come. 
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